Elster's Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory criticises functional explanations, and has an interesting summary of scientific explanations. Functional explanations are an 'objective teleology'; they postulate a purpose without a purposive actor. That is, functionalist explanations lack a causative mechanism. A tiger has stripes in order to hide better. We have eyes in order to see. The sun is in the sky so that we can see. In the case of the form of life Darwin provided us with the causal mechanism to explain how traits are gained; random mutation. Heritability and selection pressures then act somewhat like a feedback loop, at which point we can talk with our functionalist hats on.
Elster gives three main types of explanation: the causal, the functional, and the intentional. The sciences use causal explanations (which is part of what makes it science..), and the physical sciences use it exclusively. Biological sciences also use functional explanations, but this is done within the framework of the theory of evolution which provides the causal mechanism, the functional interpretation explains the why based on the utility of the attribute. Elster goes on to say that social sciences' use of intentional explanations, and the 'proper' approach should be causal-intentional, with nary a hint of functionalism.
Elster critiques Marxism for its extensive use of functionalist explanations of (capitalist) society. One part of the text that tickled me was a restatement of Bourdieu's assertion that when intellectuals play around with language and even deliberately violate the rules of grammar, that this is a 'strategy designed to exclude the petty-bourgeois would-be intellectuals'. This is a functionalist explanation that does indeed give a rationale for the observed behaviour (even if not a very good one). Elster suggests that this argument is a 'theoretical analgue of envy - arising when our "factual inability to acquire a good is wrongly interpreted as a positive action against a desire"'. Later Elster goes on to quote poetry from Goethe via Marx, so standing out like an inscrutable rhino grazing in the work canteen are four lines of German poetry in the middle of a Philosophy text. Is Elster trying to exclude me? Is my mild annoyance merely a sign of my envious regard of Elster? Or am I merely an uncultured swine?
Elster gives three main types of explanation: the causal, the functional, and the intentional. The sciences use causal explanations (which is part of what makes it science..), and the physical sciences use it exclusively. Biological sciences also use functional explanations, but this is done within the framework of the theory of evolution which provides the causal mechanism, the functional interpretation explains the why based on the utility of the attribute. Elster goes on to say that social sciences' use of intentional explanations, and the 'proper' approach should be causal-intentional, with nary a hint of functionalism.
Elster critiques Marxism for its extensive use of functionalist explanations of (capitalist) society. One part of the text that tickled me was a restatement of Bourdieu's assertion that when intellectuals play around with language and even deliberately violate the rules of grammar, that this is a 'strategy designed to exclude the petty-bourgeois would-be intellectuals'. This is a functionalist explanation that does indeed give a rationale for the observed behaviour (even if not a very good one). Elster suggests that this argument is a 'theoretical analgue of envy - arising when our "factual inability to acquire a good is wrongly interpreted as a positive action against a desire"'. Later Elster goes on to quote poetry from Goethe via Marx, so standing out like an inscrutable rhino grazing in the work canteen are four lines of German poetry in the middle of a Philosophy text. Is Elster trying to exclude me? Is my mild annoyance merely a sign of my envious regard of Elster? Or am I merely an uncultured swine?
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